University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Marketing Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

7-2002

Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions
Bargaining With Two-Sided Uncertainty
Darryl T Banks
University of Pennsylvania

Wesley Hutchinson
University of Pennsylvania

Robert J. Meyer
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers
Part of the Marketing Commons

Recommended Citation
Banks, D., Hutchinson, W., & Meyer, R. J. (2002). Reputation in Marketing Channels: RepeatedTransactions Bargaining With Two-Sided Uncertainty. Marketing Science, 21 (3), 251-272.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.21.3.251.146

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/202
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions Bargaining With TwoSided Uncertainty
Abstract
Marketing channel interactions typically feature three characteristics that have not been incorporated
together in an analytic study: (1) the parties can do business repeatedly over time, often under different
terms of trade (e.g., prices may vary), (2) the terms that the seller offers one buyer may be different from
those she offers another, giving each interaction the flavor of bilateral monopoly bargaining, and (3) the
buyer and seller come to the interaction uncertain about the valuations each holds for the good, but they
do know each other's for valuation. The seller might, for example, come to the bargaining table aware that
the buyer has a strong reputation for being willing to pay only low prices, and the buyer might come aware
that the seller is strongly reputed for high cost and is, therefore, willing to offer only high prices. The latter
characteristic raises an interesting question: When engaged in a marketing channel interaction, what type
of reputation is best for a buyer or seller to take to the bargaining table? In this paper, we answer that
question by incorporating each of the characteristics that typify channel interactions in a formal gametheoretic bargaining model. We determine how the reputations that buyers and sellers bring to the
bargaining table affect their equilibrium strategies and payoffs. Our analysis shows that, in general, the
best reputation for the seller to take to the bargaining table is one that makes the buyer nearly certain in
his belief that the seller's cost is high, a result that matches intuition. The best reputation for the buyer,
however, is counterintuitive. We show that an increase in the buyer's reputed willingness to pay can
actually cause the seller to offer a price. The best reputation for the buyer to take to the bargaining table
is, therefore, one that makes the seller believe that there is a significant chance that he is willing to pay a
high price. This result is new to the literature and brings with it immediate managerial implications that
we discuss. Our analysis also shows that modeling the buyer as a forward-looking strategic player yields
different results than does following the normal convention of modeling the buyer as a nonstrategic pricetaker. We discuss why future research on channels and on reference-dependent utility theory should
consider these differences.

Keywords
bargaining, channels of distribution, game theory, pricing research

Disciplines
Business | Marketing

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/202

Reputation in Marketing Channels:
Repeated-Transactions Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty

Darryl T. Banks
The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

J. Wesley Hutchinson
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Robert J. Meyer∗
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

∗

The authors thank Wilfred Amaldoss, Sherrod Banks, Mike Cucka, Alison Lo, Mary Frances Luce, Jagmohan

Raju, and Rafael Rob for helpful discussions; and Bill Boulding, Preyas Desai, Kendra Harris, Debu Purohit, Rick
Staelin, the Editor, Area Editor, and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Please address correspondence to the first author at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC
27708; or e-mail to dbanks@mail.duke.edu.

Reputation in Marketing Channels: Repeated-Transactions
Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
Technical Appendix: The Proofs
In this appendix we prove the lemmas and propositions stated in Appendix 2. The proofs focus primarily on
the parties’ first period strategies. This is because the second period strategies are so simple. Recall that in the
second period the parties’ optimal strategies are as outlined in §2 when both seller and buyer are myopic. That is,
the buyer accepts any offer up to his valuation; if the seller’s cost is low she offers v + if optimistic and v− if
pessimistic; and whatever the buyer’s reputation, the seller offers v + if her cost is high.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The key to proving this result is demonstrating the effect of B’s updated belief,
b1(b0, p1 ) , about S’s cost on his expected payoff. This is key because, as the results of §2 show, S’s period 2 offer will

vary depending on her cost. If S’s cost is high, then the second period offer will be v + . If S’s cost is low, then the
second period offer will be v− if β1 (• ) ≤ β o , and it will be v + if β1 (• ) ≥ β o . Therefore, on observing p1 , B’s
maximum expected payoff should he reject it is s1(0, p1 ) = (v+ − v− )[1 − b1(b0, p1 )]δ , which means that accepting any p1
such that
v+ − p1 ≥ (v+ − v− )[1− b1(b0, p1)]δ

(A.9)

provides B with a payoff at least as large as any that he can expect should he reject it. Rearranging terms shows that
any p1 ≤ p• satisfies Cdn. (A.9). Clearly, then, if p1 < p• the (high valuation) buyer accepts, i.e., y1∗( p1 ) =1 for p1 < p• .

But suppose that p1 = p• and that for this price y1( p1) <1. Then S (in general) does better to reduce her price just
slightly to exploit the fact that B certainly accepts the reduced price. This, of course, increases B’s payoff, making
him better off. So it is clear that y1∗( p1) ∈[0,1) for p1 = p• .a Having established this result, we will henceforth ignore it
for analytic convenience. With continuous prices S can set her price arbitrarily close to p• , so the result has no
qualitative impact here.b Therefore, y1∗( p1 ) =1 for all p1 ≤ p• .
We now show that certain acceptance of any p1 > p• is suboptimal. Suppose that p1 = p′ > p• and that y1∗( p1) =1
for p1 = p′. As p′ > p• ≥ v− , B’s acceptance reveals his type, which means that p2∗(κ, β1(•)) = v+,∀κ . B’s payoff is then

s1(1, p′) = v+ − p′ , which by the definition of p• , is less than (v+ − v− )[1 − b1(b0, p′)]δ . This means that his payoff is less
than the maximum that he can expect from rejecting p′ . Recall that he expects this maximum iff

β 1 (• ) ≤ β o ⇔ p 2∗ (κ − , β 1 (• )) = v − . If y1∗( p1) =1 for p1 = p′ , then S’s posterior belief (i.e., B’s posterior reputation) is

a

Thanks to the Area Editor for pointing this out to us.
This does not mean, however, that this result is unimportant. In situations with discrete prices, especially if the price grid is
coarse, this result can make a qualitative difference in the players’ strategies.
b

2

β 1 (β 0 , p ′,1, a 1 ) = 0 < β o if a1( p′) = 0, as she is then convinced that she faces a low valuation buyer. Then
p2∗(κ −, β1(•)) = v− , and B has increased his expected payoff by rejecting p′ , a contradiction.
Finally, we show that if p• is “large” (i.e., if p• =v+ ), then B may not accept p1 = p• with certainty.
Specifically, B does not accept p1 = p• =v+ with certainty if doing so induces a low cost S to offer v + . By the
definition of p• (see Eqn. (A.8) in Appendix 2), p• =v+ means that an offer of v + is a foolproof signal to B that S’s
cost is high, i.e., b1(b0, p1) = 1 for p1 = v+ . Suppose that y1∗( p1) =1 for p1 = p• =v+ . Now suppose that B’s certain
acceptance of p1 = v+ induces a low cost S to offer v + . We see that B’s strategy ruins the signal value of an offer of

v + because the offer cannot prove to B that S’s cost is high if a low cost seller also makes it, i.e., then b1(b0, p1 ) <1 for
p1 = v+ . Then p• < v+ , which implies that y1∗( p1) <1 for p1 = v+ , a contradiction. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. Take arbitrary p1 = p′ > p• and suppose that y1∗( p1 ) = y′ > 0 for p1 = p′ . Then,

because p1 = p′ > v− , the seller offers p2 = v+ if the period 1 offer is accepted whatever her cost, but if the first offer is
rejected a pessimistic low cost seller offers p2 = v− . The buyer’s expected payoff is thus

s1( y′, p′) = (v+ − p′) y′ + (v+ − v− )(1− b1(•)) (1− y′)δ . Now suppose that y1∗( p1) = 0 for p1 = p′ . Then a pessimistic low cost
seller offers p2 = v− and the buyer’s expected payoff is s1(0, p′) = (v+ − v− )(1− b1(•)) . Comparing the payoffs, we find that

s1( y′, p′) ≥ s1(0, p′) ⇒ p′ ≤ v+ − (v+ −v− )(1− b1(•))δ = p• , a contradiction. Hence, when the seller is initially pessimistic,
y1∗( p1) = 0 for p1 = p′ > p• .



PROOF OF LEMMA 1. (i) To prove that a high cost S offers no price below cost, we need to show that doing

(

)
π ( p′,κ ) = {y ( p′)[p′ − κ + (v − κ )δ ] + [1 − y ( p′)](v − κ )δ }β and any p′′ ∈[κ ,v ], the payoff from which is
π ( p′′,κ ) = {y ( p′′)[p′′ − κ + (v − κ )δ ] + [1 − y ( p′′)](v − κ )δ }β . π ( p′,κ ) ≥ π ( p′′,κ ) requires
y ( p′′) ( p′′ − κ ) .
y ( p′) ≤

so cannot maximize her payoff. Consider any p′ ∈ v−,κ + , a high cost S’s payoff from which is
+
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(A.10)

As p′ −κ + < 0 , Cdn. (A.10) can be satisfied iff y1∗( p1) = 0, ∀p1 > v− , which can be satisfied iff β0 = 0 or b1(b0, p1) = 0 , the
former of which is ruled out by assumption and the latter is a contradiction (if S’s cost is high B cannot know that her
cost is low). Therefore, π1( p′,κ + ) <π1( p′′,κ + ) , which means offering a price below her cost is strictly dominated for a
high cost seller.
We now consider po > κ + (we now know that we need not consider any p1 < κ + ). To prove that a high cost
S offers no price below po , the key is to show that B will accept po if a high cost S is willing to offer it because his
posterior belief is at least as large as his prior belief.c Assume that po is not dominated by any higher first period

c

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for calling this, the most direct route to proving this part of the result, to our

attention.
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offer for a high cost S. Then, if p1 = po , B’s updated belief is at least as large as his prior, i.e., b1(b0, p1) ≥ b0 , unless po
is dominated by some lower price for a high cost S. But as b1(b0, p1) ≥ b0 for p1 = po implies that p1 = po ≤ p• (see
Eqns. (5) and (A.8)), by Proposition 1 we know that B accepts p1 = po . So, no lower price can dominate po for a
high cost S since no such price can be accepted with any larger probability by a high valuation B, the only type B
with which a high cost S can trade. Hence, a high cost S never prices below po and, having already shown that she
never prices below cost, we have proved that she never prices below max{po ,κ + }.
(ii) To prove that on seeing any p1 < max{po ,κ + } = pmin B concludes that S’s cost is low, we show that only a
low cost seller is willing to offer such a price. We know by part (i) that for a high cost S any p1 < κ + is dominated
by any higher offer no matter how B responds to the lower or the higher offer and that it cannot benefit her to offer
any p1 < po since B will accept po if she is willing to offer it. We proceed by showing that a low cost S may be
willing to offer p1 = v − < pmin even if a high valuation B is certain to accept pmin . Then we show that if B is not
certain to accept pmin , which implies that even if B were certain to accept pmin it would be dominated by some
higher offer for a high cost S (recall that, by part (i), B accepts pmin unless it is dominated by some higher offer for a
high cost S), a low cost S may be willing to offer some p1 ∈ (v − , pmin ) . A low cost S’s payoff from take-the-surething, i.e., offer p1 = v − < pmin , is π1 (v− ,κ − ) = v− − κ − + (v− − κ − )δ , and her expected payoff from offering pmin is

π1 ( pmin,κ − ) = [pmin − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ ]β0 + (v− − κ − )(1 − β0 )δ if B is certain to accept. We find that π1 (v− ,κ − ) > π1 ( pmin,κ − )
if β0 <

v− − κ −
> 0 , which defines a set of admissible values of β0 . Hence, for admissible values of S’s
pmin − κ − + (v+ − v− )δ

initial belief about the buyer, β0 , a low cost S is willing to offer p1 = v − < pmin no matter how B responds to the
higher offer. Now suppose that B does not accept pmin with certainty. A low cost S’s expected payoff from offering

[

]

some p′ ∈ (v − , pmin ) is π1 ( p′,κ − ) = y1( p′) p′ − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − )[1 − y1( p′) β0 ]δ , where y1( p′) is the probability
with which B accepts p′ . Comparing this payoff with a low cost S’s payoff from p1 = v − (which is an offer that we
have established her willingness to make) reveals that π1 ( p′,κ − ) > π1 (v− ,κ − ) if y1( p′) β0 >

v− − κ −
< 1 , which
p′ − κ − + (v+ − v− )δ

defines a set of admissible values of the product y1( p′) β0 . Hence, for admissible values of S’s initial belief, β0 , and
B’s response, y1( p′) , to p′ ∈ (v − , pmin ) , a low cost S is willing to offer such p′ . We have thus shown that there exist
conditions under which a low cost S will choose p1 = v − < pmin and conditions under which she will choose
p1 ∈ (v − , pmin ) . Having shown in part (i) that there are no conditions under which a high cost S offers any p1 < pmin ,

we have established that only a low cost S can benefit from making any such offer. The Intuitive Criterion is
therefore invoked to assign zero weight to the likelihood that any p1 < pmin is offered by a high cost S. Hence, on
seeing any such offer, B concludes that S’s cost is low, i.e., b1(b0, p1) = 0 . 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. (i) Observe that p • = p − if b1(•) = 0 (see Eqns. (6) and (A.8)). Then, p − ≤ p • for all

values of b1(•) and, by Proposition 1, the buyer optimally accepts.
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(ii) Given that the buyer is certain to accept p − , it is clear that no p1 ∈ (v − , p− ) is optimal for either seller type
whatever the buyer’s reputation. Then, we need only compare an optimistic low cost seller’s payoff from p1 = p − ,

π1( p− ,κ − ) = [p− − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ ]β0 + (v− − κ − )(1 − β0 ) δ , with that from p1 = v − , π1(v− ,κ − ) = v− − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 . We
find that π1( p− ,κ − ) ≤ π1(v− ,κ − ) ⇒ β0 ≤ β o , a contradiction if the seller is optimistic. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. By Lemma 1, b1(b0 , p1 ) = 0 for p1 < pmin . This means that if p1 ∈ ( p− , pmin ) , then
p1 > p• . By Corollary 1, we know that B rejects any such price when S is pessimistic.

]

(i) The condition that defines hyper pessimism is π1 (v− ,κ − ) > π1 ( p′,κ − ), ∀p′ ∈ (v− , v+ , irrespective of B’s
response to p ′ . That is, a hyper pessimistic low cost S’s expected payoff from v− exceeds that from any price that
B will accept, even if (a high valuation) B is certain to accept v + . Then, by the Intuitive Criterion, we have

[

]

b1(b0, p1 ) =1 for any p1 ∈ p min , v + that B’s strategy makes optimal for a high cost S, which implies that p1 ≤ p• = v+

and, by Proposition 1, y1∗( p1) =1 for any such price. By Proposition 1 we know that this means that B optimally
accepts p1 = p• = v+ with certainty, which makes v + the optimal offer for a hyper pessimistic high cost S.

[

Note that B’s certain acceptance of v + makes all p1 ∈ pmin, v+ ) suboptimal for both S types whatever
posterior beliefs and responses such offers induce. So the Intuitive Criterion has no bite for these prices. We
assume that b1(b0, p1 ) =1 for any such price, which, by Proposition 1, implies that y1∗( p1) =1 for all such prices (this has
no effect on S’s strategy).

]

(ii) The condition that defines a very pessimistic S is π1 (v− ,κ − ) > π1 ( p′,κ − ), ∀p′ ∈ (v− , p+ , whatever B’s
response to p ′ . That is, a very pessimistic low cost S’s expected payoff from v− exceeds that from any price up to
(though not beyond) p+ . The key to proving this part of the lemma is showing that B’s threat of certain rejection of
all p1 > p+ is credible when S is very pessimistic.
We first show that B’s best response to p1 = p+ is to accept with certainty. This is easy to see, as, given the
above-stated relationship between the payoffs from v− and p+ , we have b1(b0, p1 ) =1 for p1 = p+ by the Intuitive
Criterion. This means that p1 < p• = v+ and, by Proposition 1, y1∗( p1) =1 for p1 = p+ .
Next, consider some p1 > p+ . Of course, B would like to force S to avoid such prices, if he can. We show that
his threat to reject all such offers does force S to avoid these prices if it is credible, and then we show that the threat
is credible. First, note that no p1 > p+ is dominated for either S type if B accepts with large enough probability, as
then, by the definition of p+ , a very pessimistic low cost S (as well as a high cost S) is willing to offer such a price.
Second, note that if B is certain to reject all p1 > p+ , then all such prices are dominated by v − for a low cost S. Last,
note that B’s certain rejection of p1 > p+ makes any such price (at least weakly) dominated for a high cost S by all

[

]

p1 ∈ pmin, p+ , as from any of the latter she gets trade with positive probability and non-negative profit. Hence, if

credible, B’s threat to reject all p1 > p+ renders all such prices suboptimal for both S types and, therefore, zero
probability prices. Since both S types will consider p1 > p+ if B accepts with large enough probability, we cannot
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invoke the Intuitive Criterion to assign zero weight to either S type when p1 > p+ . So for any such price b1(b0, p1) = b0 ,
meaning that p• = po < p+ < p1 , and, by Corollary 1, y1∗( p1 ) = 0 . B’s rejection threat is, thus, credible.

[

B’s certain acceptance of p+ makes all p1 ∈ pmin, p+ ) suboptimal for both S types whatever B’s posterior
beliefs and responses. We assume that b1(b0, p1 ) =1 and, by Proposition 1, that y1∗( p1) =1 for these zero probability
prices (with no effect on S’s strategy).
(iii) The condition that defines moderate pessimism is π1 (v− ,κ − ) < π1 ( p′,κ − ), ∀p′ ≥ pmin if B accepts p ′ with
sufficiently large probability. That is, a moderately pessimistic low cost S is willing to set any price that a high cost
S is willing to set, given that B accepts the price with large enough probability.
(a) The situation here is that po ≥ κ + . The key to proving this part of the lemma is to show that B’s threatened
certain rejection of all p1 > po is credible when S is moderately pessimistic and po ≥ κ + . Fortunately, it is easy to see
that the arguments in support of the credibility of B’s threat are precisely the same as those expressed above in
support of the credibility of his threat to reject all p1 > p+ . Simply replace p+ with p o , and the same results hold.
Then, because a moderately pessimistic high cost S prefers p o to any higher price, we have b1(b0, p1) ≥ b0 for p1 = po ,
which means that p• ≥ p1 = po and, by Proposition 1, y1∗( p1) =1 for p1 = po . Then, by the definition of moderate
pessimism, p o is also optimal for a low cost S, and b1(b0, p1) = b0 , p1 = p• = po , and y1∗( p1) =1 for p1 = po , as required.d
We have established B’s beliefs on observing and best responses to lower prices in Lemmas 1 and 2.
(b) Here the situation is that po < κ + . Proving this part of the lemma involves several steps. We must first
show that B’s optimal strategy is such that no p1 ≥ κ + is optimal for a low cost S. Second, we must show that B’s
strategy must make v + the optimal price for a high cost S but not for a low cost S, which imposes an upper bound
on the probability with which B can accept v + . Last, we must show that the lower limit on the probability with
which B optimally accepts v + is positive.
Suppose B’s optimal strategy is such that some p1 ≥ κ + is optimal for both S types. Then, for that price
b1(b0, p1) = b0 ⇒ p• = po < κ + ≤ p1 . By Corollary 1, we know y1∗( p1) = 0 for any such price, a contradiction, as a

pessimistic low cost S does better with v − than she does with any price certain to be rejected. It is clear that the

d

Note, however, that if the seller’s belief is at the boundary of moderate pessimism, i.e., if β0 = β − , then if her cost is low, the
seller’s payoff from take-the-sure-thing equals her expected payoff from learn-then-discriminate by offering p o . In such an
instance, a low cost seller may randomize her first period offer, i.e., she may choose either v − or p o , both with positive
probability. Therefore, if β0 = β − , an offer of p o need not necessarily be a pooling offer, and the buyer’s updated belief on
observing it falls somewhere in the interval bounded below by the prior, b0 (the buyer’s updated belief if the offer is pooling),
and bounded above by 1 (the buyer’s updated belief if the offer is separating). But even if β0 = β − , the buyer’s optimal strategy is
unaffected. Because his updated belief is at least as large as his prior on observing p o , it is still optimal for him to accept. Most
important, however, is that his updated belief on observing offers higher than p o is unaffected. That is, for p1 > po , the updated
buyer belief is the same as his prior because either type of seller would make such an offer if he accepts with sufficiently large
probability. His updated belief on observing any p1 > po supports the optimality of rejecting any such offer. In any event, the
case of β0 = β − can be considered special, and as such we relegate its consideration to Proposition 4, which deals with all such
special cases.
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same argument holds for any strategy such that any p1 ≥ κ + is optimal for a low cost S but not for a high cost S, as
then b1(b0, p1) = 0 ⇒ p• = p− < κ + ≤ p1 ⇒ y1∗( p1) = 0, yielding the same contradiction. We have thus shown that if po < κ + ,
moderate pessimism implies B’s optimal responses to all p1 ≥ κ + makes all such prices suboptimal for a low cost S.
We now show that B’s strategy must make v + the optimal price for a high cost S. Suppose that B’s best

[

responses to p1 ≥ κ + are such that some p1 ∈ κ +, v+ ) is optimal for a high cost S. Then, as all p1 ≥ κ + are suboptimal for
a low cost S, for any such price we have b1(b0, p1 ) =1, implying that p1 < p• = v+ and, by Proposition 1, that y1∗( p1) =1 for
any such price. This is a contradiction, as, by the definition of moderate pessimism, B’s certain acceptance of any
price that a high cost S is willing to set makes such a price optimal for a low cost S as well, and we have already

[

shown that no such price can be optimal for a low cost S. B’s optimal strategy must, therefore, render all p1 ∈ κ +, v+ )
suboptimal for both seller types. Therefore, as some p1 ≥ κ + must be optimal for a high cost S, it must be the case
that the optimal strategy for B must be such that p1∗(κ + ) = v+ . Further, since a low cost S must not be tempted to offer
this price, by the definition of y− , we know that y1∗( p1) < y− for p1 = v+ . Then, we have b1(b0, p1 ) =1 for p1 = v+ , as
required.
We conclude our examination of B’s optimal strategy by showing that y1∗( p1) > 0 for p1 = v+ . Suppose that B
optimally rejects p1 = v+ with certainty. Then a high cost S, anticipating his response, prices a bit lower than v + .
This reveals to B that S’s cost is high since a moderately pessimistic low cost S chooses no such price, and we have
b1(b0, p1 ) =1. Then p1 < p• = v+ , which implies that y1∗( p1) =1, which we have already ruled out. Therefore, y1∗( p1) > 0 for

p1 = v+ . Together with the previous result, this means that y1∗( p1) ∈(0, y− ) for p1 = v+ , as required.

[

Finally, we consider B’s posterior beliefs and responses on observing any p1 ∈ κ + , v + ). We have determined
that all such prices must be suboptimal for both seller types. We also know that if B accepts with large enough
probability, either moderately pessimistic S type is willing to choose prices from this range. So, we cannot use the
Intuitive Criterion to place zero weight on either type if such a price is observed. We assume that any such price

[

yields no information about S’s type, i.e., b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 for all p1 ∈ κ + , v + ).e Therefore, they all exceed p • and, by
Corollary 1, y1∗( p1) = 0 for all such prices. This renders all of them suboptimal for both S types, as required. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. The fundamental logic of Corollary 2 is owed to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983, pp.

224 – 225) for p• < p1 ≤ v+ . We extend their logic, however, for the case of p1 = p• = v+ .
First, note that by the definition of y o , if the buyer’s response to any p1 > v− is y o , then the seller’s posterior
belief is β o if the outcome is rejection. A low cost seller is then indifferent between offering v − and v + in the
second period. Next, note that for a mixed strategy to be optimal for the buyer, it is necessary that he be indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the offer. So let η 2 ( p1 ) be the probability with which an indifferent low cost seller
offers v + in period 2. The buyer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in period 1 if

7

v+ − p1 = (v+ − v− )[1− b1(b0, p1 )][1−η2 ( p1)]δ .

(A.11)

And from Eqn. (A.11) we get the period 2 strategy of a low cost seller that yields buyer indifference in period 1.
Call that strategy η 2∗ ( p1 ) .

η2∗ ( p1 ) = 1 −

v+ − p1
(v − v )[1 − b1(b0 , p1 )]δ
+

−

(A.12)

]

Now take some p1 ∈( p• , v+ . Suppose that for such a price y1∗( p1 ) > yo . Then, by Bayes’ rule (see Eqn. (A.1))

β1 (•,0) < β o . That is, if the observed outcome is a rejection of the price, S is made pessimistic and a low cost S then

]

chooses p2 = v− , which, by Proposition 1, means that y1∗( p1 ) = 0 , a contradiction. Hence, y1∗( p1 ) ≤ yo for all p1 ∈( p• , v+ .
Now take some p1 ∈( p•, v+ ) and suppose that for such a price y1∗( p1 ) < yo . Then, by Bayes’ rule, β1(•) > β o .
That is, whatever the observed outcome, S remains optimistic and p2 = v+ whatever her cost. As such, B should
accept the first period price with certainty, a contradiction. Hence, y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any p1 ∈( p•, v+ ) .
But suppose that p1 = v+ > p• . This means that a low cost S or both S types expect that pricing at v + is at least
as profitable as any other strategy. So, given that y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any p1 ∈( p•, v+ ) , if B’s best response to p1 = v+ is
some y1∗( p1 ) < yo , S reduces her price ever so slightly to exploit the fact that B accepts any lower price with larger
probability. Such a reduced price yields a positive surplus for B while not violating the conditions necessary for him
to optimally play a mixed strategy (see Eqns. (A.11) and (A.12)). Accepting v + with probability yo yields the

[

reservation utility, 0, for B, so it is clear that y1∗ ( p1 ) ∈ 0, yo ) for p1 =v+ > p• . Note that this situation is similar to the
case of p1 = p• and, for the same reason, we will ignore this result (i.e., S can price arbitrarily close to v + ).

]

Therefore, y1∗( p1 ) = yo for all p1 ∈( p• , v+ .
Finally, we consider the situation when p1 = p• = v+ and show that in this situation y1∗( p1 ) ≥ yo . By the
definition of p• , p• = v+ means that a high cost S finds v + an optimal price and a low cost S does not. Therefore,
+
b1(b0, p1 ) =1 for p1 = v+ . This implies that v is dominated by some lower price for a low cost S when B’s response to

v + is yo . Suppose that B’s optimal strategy is such that some p1 < v+ is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low
cost S. Then, for such a price we have b1(b0, p1 ) =1, implying that p• = v+ > p1 , which means that y1∗( p1) =1. Then,
however, this price is also optimal for an optimistic low cost S, as an optimistic low cost S is willing to set any price
that a high cost S is willing to set if B is certain to accept such a price, a contradiction. Hence, when S is optimistic
B’s optimal strategy must be such that no p1 < v+ is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S, i.e., b1(b0, p1 ) ≤ b0
for any such price. Then y1∗( p1 ) = yo for, at minimum, any p1 ∈( po, v+ ) when S is optimistic. Therefore, it cannot be
the case that y1∗( p1 ) < yo for p1 = v+ , as such a response makes it optimal for a high cost S but not a low cost S to price

e

Such uninformed off the equilibrium path beliefs have been called “passive conjectures” (Fudenberg and Tirole [1983]), and we
use passive conjectures frequently in this analysis. We should point out, however, that there are other ways of modeling such off
the equilibium path beliefs (interested readers should see Cho and Kreps [1987]; Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]).
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just lower than v + , which we have ruled out. (If a low cost S is unwilling to price at v + when B’s response is yo ,
she cannot be willing to set any lower price when B’s response to that price is yo ). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. By Corollary 2 we know that when S is optimistic y1∗( p1) ≥ yo for all p1 ≤ v+ and that

]

y1∗( p1 ) = yo for all p1 ∈( p• , v+ .

(i) The conditions that define hyper optimism are π1( p−,κ − ) ≤π1(v+ ,κ − ) and π1( po,κ + ) ≤π1(v+ ,κ + ) when v + is
accepted with probability yo , even if po is certain to be accepted (recall that p− is always accepted with certainty).
To prove this part of the lemma we need to show that B’s optimal strategy must be such that no p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) is
optimal for either S type, from which it follows that p1 = v+ is optimal for both S types given the above-stated
relationships between the payoffs. We will then show that B’s best response to S’s optimal price, v + , is unique.
We first establish that if β0 = β + a high cost S is not indifferent between offering v + and po . Let β0 = β + so
that a high cost S’s expected payoff from v + equals that from po when the response to the former is yo and the latter
is accepted with certainty. If she is indifferent between the two prices and if, in her indifference, she offers p1 = v+
with positive probability, then B’s posterior belief on observing p1 = po is less than his prior and he does not accept
po with certainty. But then a high cost S is not indifferent between these two prices; rather, she prefers p1 = v+ .

Because we already know, by Lemma 1, that all p1 < po are dominated for a high cost S, this result says that hyper

]

optimism implies that all p1 ≤ po are dominated for a high cost S. Then for any p1 ∈( p−, po we have b1(b0, p1) = 0 ,
which means that p− = p• < p1 and, by Corollary 2, y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any such price. But as y1∗( p1) ≥ yo for all p1 ≤ v+ , it is

]

immediately clear that no p1 ∈( p−, po is optimal for either a low or a high cost hyper optimistic S.
Next consider p1 ∈( po, v+ ) . Suppose that B’s optimal strategy is such that some such price is optimal for both
S types. Then we have b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 , from which it follows that po = p• < p1 , which means that y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any such
price. The contradiction is clear, as y1∗( p1) ≥ yo for p1 = v+ . Now suppose that B’s optimal strategy is such that some
p1 ∈( po, v+ ) is optimal for a low cost S but not for a high cost S. Then we have b1(b0, p1) = 0 , implying that p− = p• < p1 ,
and therefore y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any such price, yielding the same contradiction. Now suppose that B’s optimal strategy
is such that some p1 ∈( po, v+ ) is optimal for a high cost S but not for a low cost S. Then we have b1(b0, p1 ) =1, from
which it follows that v+ = p• > p1 , meaning that y1∗( p1) =1. However, B’s certain acceptance of such a price also
induces an optimistic low cost S to set that price, which means that b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 , and po = p• < p1 , and y1∗( p1 ) = yo for
any such price, and the familiar contradiction reappears. Hence, when S is hyper optimistic, B’s optimal strategy
must be such that no p1 ∈( po, v+ ) is optimal for either S type.
We have shown that hyper optimism means that no p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) can be optimal for either S type. From this
result and Lemma 1, it immediately follows that p1∗(κ + ) = v+ . We conclude our discussion of B’s optimal responses
by showing that yo is a unique best response to p1 = v+ . Recall that one of the conditions that define hyper optimism
is π1( p−,κ − ) ≤π1(v+ ,κ − ) when B accepts v + with probability yo . If, in fact, π1( p−,κ − ) < π1(v+ ,κ − ) then it is clear that
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o
b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 for p1 = v+ , and po = p• < p1 . Then B’s optimal response, y , is unique as is a low cost S’s optimal price,

p1∗(κ − ) = v+ . But suppose a low cost S is indifferent between p1 = v+ and p1 = p− because π1( p−,κ − ) =π1(v+ ,κ − ) when B’s
response to v + is yo , i.e., β0 = β ++ .f We know that the probability with which B must accept p1 = v+ is at least yo ,
but can he accept with any larger probability? It is easy to see that he cannot, for accepting v + with any larger
probability yields π1( p−,κ − ) < π1(v+ ,κ − ) and a low cost S is not indifferent. Therefore, B’s best response to v + is
unique, yo . This also means that B’s optimal strategy will leave a hyper optimistic low cost S indifferent between

v + and p− , i.e., p1∗(κ − )∈{p−, v+}, when it happens that β0 = β ++ .g
Finally, we consider B’s posterior beliefs on observing zero (prior) probability p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) and his best
responses to such prices. It is clear that any price lower than p × is dominated for a high cost S, for even if B accepts
such a price with certainty, her expected payoff is smaller than that she expects from v + when B accepts v + with
probability yo . We invoke the Intuitive Criterion to set b1(b0, p1) = 0 for any such price. Given this belief, we have
p− = p• < p1 , implying y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any p1 ∈( p−, p× ) , which makes any such price suboptimal for a low as well as a

high cost S, as required. The Intuitive Criterion loses its bite, however, for prices at least as high as p × because
such prices are not dominated for either S type if B accepts with sufficiently large probability. We therefore assume
that these prices are uninformative, i.e., b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 for all such prices. Given this belief, and since p× > po , we have

[

po = p• < p1 , so y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any p1 ∈ p×, v+ ) , which makes any such price suboptimal for both S types, as required.

(ii) The conditions that define a very optimistic S are π1( p−,κ − ) >π1(v+ ,κ − ) and π1( po,κ + ) ≤π1(v+ ,κ + ) when v + is
accepted with probability yo , even if po is accepted with certainty. Proving this part of the lemma requires us to
show that all p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) must be suboptimal for both S types, from which it follows that p1 = v+ is optimal for a high
cost S given the above-stated relationship between her payoffs from po and v + . We must also show that B’s
response to a high cost S’s price must be smaller than y+ , making p1 = p− the optimal price for a low cost S.
First, note that precisely the same result given above for the case of β0 = β + also applies here, i.e., a high
cost S strictly prefers p1 = v+ to p1 = po when the former is accepted with probability yo and the latter is accepted
with certainty. Hence, all p1 ≤ po are suboptimal for a very optimistic high cost S. So, as before, for any p1 ∈( p−, po

]

we have b1(b0, p1) = 0 , yielding p− = p• < p1 , implying y1∗( p1 ) = yo for any such price, rendering all such prices
suboptimal for both S types.

f

Comparing Eqns. (A.3) and (A.6) reveals that β + may take on a larger value than β + + . If β + > β + + , it is easy to show that the
equilibria do not change. If β + > β + + , then S cannot be very optimistic and she is hyper optimistic if β 0 ≥ β + .

And in her indifference, a low cost seller may randomize between v + and p− , which means that on observing a first period offer
of v + , the buyer’s updated belief need not be the same as his prior. Rather, it falls somewhere in the interval [b0 ,1] , depending
g

upon the probability with which a low cost seller makes one or the other offer. But, as shown above, the buyer’s strategy is
unaffected by this. The case of β0 = β + + is a special one, and we handle it in Proposition 4.
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Now consider p1 ∈( po, v+ ) . Again, exactly the same arguments used to show that all prices in this interval
must be suboptimal for both S types under hyper optimism also apply when S is very optimistic. Therefore, B’s
optimal strategy is such that all p1 ∈( po, v+ ) are suboptimal for a very optimistic S, which, together with the previous
result, means that all p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) must be suboptimal for a very optimistic S.
Having established that when S is very optimistic B’s optimal strategy must be such that all p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) are
suboptimal for both S types, it is clear that it must be the case that p1∗(κ + ) = v+ . How should B respond to this price?
Let us suppose that his optimal response is such that v + is optimal for both S types (which means that y1 > yo ,
otherwise, by the definition of a very optimistic S, π1( p−,κ − ) >π1(v+ ,κ − ) and v + is not optimal for a low cost S). But if

v + is optimal for both S types, we have b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 for p1 = v+ , implying that po = p• < p1 , and therefore y1∗( p1 ) = yo .
This is a contradiction, as v + is suboptimal for a very optimistic low cost S when B’s response to this price is yo .
Therefore, B’s response to v + must be such that this price is suboptimal for a low cost S, and by the definition of y+ ,
this means that y1∗( p1) < y+ for p1 = v+ . Since we know that seller optimism means that y1∗( p1 ) ≥ yo for p1 = v+ , it must

[

be the case that y1∗( p1 )∈ yo, y+ ) for this price. Given B’s best response, we have b1(b0, p1 ) =1 for p1 = v+ , as required. It

[

is clear that the interval yo, y+ ) always exists when S is very optimistic.
Finally, we consider B’s beliefs on observing and best responses to zero probability p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) . We again
invoke the Intuitive Criterion to set b1(b0, p1) = 0 for all p1 < p× , as all such prices are dominated by v + for a high cost

[

S. And, again, as p1 ∈ p× , v + ) are not dominated for either S type if B accepts with large enough probability, these

[

prices are uninformative and we set b1(b0, p1 ) = b0 for p1 ∈ p× , v + ) . Given these beliefs, B optimally accepts any
p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) with probability yo , making all such prices suboptimal for a very optimistic S of either type, as required.
(iii) The condition that defines moderate optimism is π1( po,κ + ) >π1(v+ ,κ + ) when B accepts v + with probability

yo and he accepts po with certainty. It is easy to show that this condition also implies that π1( po,κ − ) > π1( p′,κ − ) for all
p′ > po . Therefore, b1(b0, p1) = b0 for p1 = po , meaning that p1 = p• = po and, by Proposition 1, that y1∗( p1) =1 for p1 = po
when S is moderately optimistic.
We now consider B’s beliefs on observing and best responses to zero probability prices. By Lemma 1 we
know that b1(b0, p1) = 0 for any p1 ∈( p−, po ) , and, therefore y1∗( p1 ) = yo for all such prices, by Corollary 2. Then B’s best
response to any p1 ∈( p−, po ) renders all such prices suboptimal for either S type, as required. Because either S type is
willing to set p1 > po if B accepts with sufficiently large probability, we assume that any such price is uninformative

]

and set b1(b0, p1) = b0 for any such price. Given this belief, we know by Corollary 2 that y1∗( p1 ) = yo for all p1 ∈( po, v+ ,
which, by the definition of moderate optimism, makes all such prices suboptimal for both S types, as required. 

The next three proofs are those of the equilibria given by Propositions 2, 3, and 4. These proofs focus on
showing that deviations from the stated equilibria are not profitable for the seller. The logic underlying the buyer’s
strategies is stated by the results that precede these three proofs, and when one of those results is used in the proof of
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one of the following propositions, we clearly reference it to help the reader understand why it applies in the current
context.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. (i) By definition, if the seller is moderately pessimistic and β0 > β − , then a low

cost seller’s expected payoff from offering any first period price that she would offer were her cost high, given that
B is sufficiently likely to accept such a price, exceeds her payoff from take-the-sure-thing. That is,

π1 (v− ,κ − ) < π1 ( p′,κ − ), ∀p′ ≥ pmin if B accepts p ′ with sufficiently large probability. She is moderately optimistic
when a high cost seller’s expected payoff from offering po exceeds her expected payoff from offering v + , i.e.,

π1( po,κ + ) >π1(v+ ,κ + ) if B accepts v + with probability yo and accepts po with certainty.
Let us first consider the case when the seller is moderately pessimistic and p o ≥ κ + . We know by Lemmas
1, 2, and 3 that under such conditions B’s optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept the first period price if it is po ,
in which case B’s updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., b1(•) = b0 (see part iii.a of Lemma 3).
(2) Reject if the first period price is higher than po , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his prior, i.e.,

b1(•) = b0 (see part iii.a of Lemma 3). (3) Reject if the first period price is in the interval ( p − , p o ) , in which case B
concludes that the seller’s cost is low, i.e., b1(•) = 0 , because, by Lemma 1, we know that p o ≥ κ + means that

p o = p min , and that if the seller’s cost is high she never offers a price below p min . (4) Accept if the first period
price is less than or equal to p− , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief.
Consider a deviation by the seller. Can she profit by deviating to a lower first period offer? By Lemma 1 we
know that it is never profitable for the seller to offer any p1 < po = pmin if her cost is high. Now consider whether the
seller would profit from offering some p1 < po if her cost is low. Given B’s certain acceptance of po (if his valuation
is high), it is clear that the seller cannot profit from offering any p1 ∈(v−, po ) , as at any such price her margin is lower
and the likelihood of its acceptance is no greater. And by the definition of moderate pessimism, if the seller’s cost is
low her expected payoff is larger if she offers any p′ ≥ pmin = po than it is if she offers v− (or any price lower than v−
since no price is accepted with greater likelihood) when B accepts p′ with sufficiently large probability. But here B
is certain to accept p′ = po . Therefore, whether her cost is low or high, it is not profitable for the seller to deviate to
any p1 < po .
Can the seller profit by deviating to a higher first period offer? To see that she cannot we note that the proof
of Lemma 3 shows that B’s threat to reject any p1 > po is credible, so any such price is certain to be rejected. Now,
observe that if B rejects such a price, then if a moderately pessimistic low cost seller makes such an offer her payoff

[

]

is 0 + (v− −κ − )δ , and it is easy to show that this is smaller than po − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − )(1− β0 )δ , the expected

payoff that is hers if she learns-then-discriminates by offering po . And it is even easier to see that B’s rejection of
any p1 > po means that a high cost seller’s expected payoff from offering such a price, 0 + (v+ − κ + ) β0δ , can be no

[

]

larger than her payoff from offering po , which is po −κ + + (v+ −κ + )δ β0 . Therefore, whether her cost is low or high, it
is not profitable for the seller to deviate to any p1 > po .
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Now consider the case when the seller is moderately optimistic. We know by Lemmas 1, 2, and 4 that under
this condition B’s optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept the first period price if it is po , in which case B’s
updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., b1(•) = b0 . (2) Accept with probability yo if the first
period price is in the interval ( p − , p o ) , in which case B’s updated belief is b1(•) = 0 because moderate optimism does
not exist unless p min = p o , and, by Lemma 1, we know that if the seller’s cost is high she never offers a price below

]

h
p min . (3) Accept with probability yo if the first period price is in the interval ( p o , v + , in which case B’s updated

belief is the same as his prior (see part iii of Lemma 4). (4) Accept if the first period price is less than or equal to
p− , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief.
Consider a deviation to a lower first period offer. Again, by Lemma 1 we know that no p1 < po = pmin can be
profitable for the seller if her cost is high. If the seller’s cost is low, then, again, as B is certain to accept po (if his

[

valuation is high), deviating to any p1 ∈ p−, po ) is not profitable, as at any such price her margin is lower and the
likelihood of its acceptance is no greater. And, by Lemma 2.ii, we know that if the seller’s cost is low, optimism (of
any degree) implies that her expected payoff from offering p− exceeds that from offering any lower price; thus, if no

[

p1 ∈ p−, po ) is a profitable deviation, neither can be any p1 < p− .
Consider a deviation to a higher period 1 offer. By the definition of moderate pessimism, we know that if the
seller’s cost is high her expected payoff from offering po exceeds that from offering v+ when B is certain to accept
the former and accepts the latter with probability yo , as is the case here. Further, because here B accepts any price

]

in ( p o , v + with probability yo , it is clear that if the seller’s cost is high she cannot profit from deviating to any price
higher than po .
Next we show that the seller does not profit by deviating to a higher first period offer if her cost is low. To
do so, we need to show that if a high cost seller’s payoff from po is larger than it is from v+ (and, hence, any offer in

( p o , v ]), then the same is true about a low cost seller’s payoff.
+

If the seller’s cost is low, then straightforward

algebra shows that her expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering po exceeds that from
gambling by offering v+ (when B is certain to accept po and accepts v+ with probability yo ) if

yo <

[p o − κ

−

]
)β

− (v − − κ − )δ β 0 + (v − − κ − )δ

(v

+

−κ

−

≡ y ′ − . By comparison, if the seller’s cost is high the same sort of

0

comparison reveals that her expected payoff is higher from offering po than it is from offering v+ if

yo <

po −κ +
−
o
≡ y ′ + . Now observe that if y′ , the value of y below which a low cost seller’s payoff is larger from
+
+
v −κ

po , is larger than y′+ , a high cost seller’s threshold, it means that a low cost seller’s payoff from from po exceeds
that from v+ for all values of yo where the same holds for a high cost seller. Notice that y′− is a function of β 0 ,

h

The seller is moderately optimistic when β o < β 0 < β + . But if p min ≠ p o ⇔ p min = κ + , then Eqn. (A.3) shows that β + = β o ,
so the seller cannot be moderately optimistic.
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while y′+ is not. It is easy to show that y′− decreases in β 0 . Thus, the smallest value of y′− is its value when β 0
−
o
approaches 1, in which case y′− approaches p − κ , its infimum, and inf y′− > y′+ implies that all y′− exceed y′+ .
+
−
v −κ

Straightforward algebra shows that inf y′− ≤ y′+ requires that v+ ≤ po , which requires that either b0 = 1 or δ = 0 or
v− =v+ , all of which are ruled out by assumption. Therefore, y′− > y′+ , which implies that a low cost seller does not
deviate to a first period offer higher than po if a high cost seller does not, and we have already established that a
moderately optimistic high cost seller does not.
(ii) By the definition of hyper optimism, the seller is hyper optimistic when β 0 ≥ β + + , and both of the
following conditions hold. (1) A low cost seller’s expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering
p− , which B is certain to accept, is no more than is her expected payoff from gambling by offering v+ , when B
accepts v+ with probability yo . (2) A high cost seller’s expected payoff from offering v+ , which B accepts with
probability yo , is at least as large as is her expected payoff from offering po if B accepts with certainty. Observe
that because yo increases in β 0 , it follows that the strict inequality, β 0 > β + + , implies that a low cost seller’s
payoff from gambling by offering v+ strictly exceeds her payoff from learn-then-discriminate with an offer of p− .

]

By Lemma 4.i we know that B optimally accepts all p1 ∈( p−, v+ with probability yo when the seller is hyper
optimistic, in which case his updated belief about the seller is the same as his prior, i.e., b1(•) = b0 . And, whatever his
or the seller’s belief, we know by Lemma 2 that B is certain to accept any p1 ≤ p− .
Consider a deviation by the seller to a lower first period offer. It is clear that no deviation to any p1 ∈( p−, v+ )
can be profitable for the seller whether her cost is low or high since no such offer is accepted with any greater
probability than is v+ , and all yield smaller margins. B is certain to accept an offer of p− , yet the expected payoff for
a low cost seller is less than that she expects from an offer of v+ , and as p− < maxp
{ o,κ +}= pmin, we know by Lemma 1
that a high cost seller does not profitably deviate to p− (or any lower offer). And, by Lemma 2, we know that, when
optimistic, a low cost seller’s expected payoff from p− exceeds that from any lower offer, implying that the payoff
from all prices lower than p− are smaller than is that from v+ . Hence, whatever her cost, a hyper optimistic seller
does not profitably deviate to a first period offer lower than v+ .
It is clear that a deviation to a price higher than v+ cannot be profitable since at any such price there is certain
rejection, while p1 =v+ is accepted with probability yo > 0. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. (i) By definition the seller is hyper pessimistic if a low cost seller’s payoff from

take-the-sure-thing (i.e., making a first period offer of v− ) exceeds that from any offer up to and including v+ ,
whatever B’s response to the higher offer. We know by Lemma 3 that when the seller is hyper pessimistic B’s

[

]

optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept the first period price if it is in the interval pmin, v+ , in which case B’s
updated belief about the seller is b1(•) =1 (i.e., B takes any such offer as conclusive evidence that the seller’s cost is
high). (2) Reject if p1 ∈( p−, pmin) , in which case B’s updated belief is b1(•) = 0 (i.e., B takes all such offers as proof that
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the seller’s cost is low because they are lower than pmin, the lowest offer that a high cost seller would ever make).
(3) Accept if p1 ≤ p− , which, by Lemma 2, we know B accepts whatever his belief.
Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high. It is clear that it is not profitable for her to deviate to

[

any p1 ∈ pmin, v+ ) , as no such price is accepted with any greater likelihood than is v+ and all yield lower margins. And
because we know by Lemma 1 that she does not profitably deviate to any p1 < pmin, we can conclude that the seller
does not profit from a deviation to a price lower than v+ if her cost is high. It is also clear that deviating to a price
higher than v+ does not pay, for at any such price there is no chance of trade, while at v+ there is trade yielding a
positive margin with positive probability. Therefore, a hyper optimistic high cost seller does not profitably deviate
from offering v+ .
Now consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low. As no offer is accepted with any greater likelihood
than is v− , offering a lower price cannot be more profitable. It is easy to show that, when hyper pessimistic, takethe-sure-thing, the payoff from which is v− −κ − + (v− −κ − )δ , dominates offering any p1 >v+ , the payoff from which is

[

]

0 + (v− −κ − )δ , and at least weakly dominates offering any p′∈ pmin, v+ , the payoff from which is

[p′ −κ + (v
−

+

]

− κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − )(1− β0 )δ . Hence, when hyper pessimistic, a low cost seller does not optimally deviate

from take-the-sure-thing.
(ii) By definition the seller is very pessimistic if a low cost seller’s payoff from take-the-sure-thing exceeds

]

that from offering any price in the interval (v−, p+ , no matter how B responds to such a price. By Lemma 3 we know
that when the seller is very pessimistic B’s optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept the first period price if it is in

[

]

the interval pmin, p+ , in which case B’s updated belief about the seller is b1(•) =1 (i.e., B takes any such offer as proof
that the seller’s cost is high). (2) Reject if p1 > p+ , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his prior. (3)
Reject if p1 ∈( p−, pmin) , in which case B’s updated belief is b1(•) = 0 (i.e., B takes all such offers as proof that the
seller’s cost is low because they are lower than pmin). (4) Accept if p1 ≤ p− .

[

Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high. Because no p1 ∈ pmin, p+ ) is accepted with any greater
likelihood than is p+ , and all yield smaller margins, it is clear that a high cost seller does not profit by deviating to
any such price. And by Lemma 1 we know that she does not profitably to any p1 < pmin. Hence, a very pessimistic
high cost seller makes no first period offer lower than p+ . Might she make a higher first period offer? Lemma 3
shows that B’s threat to reject any p1 > p+ is credible when the seller is very pessimistic. Therefore, offering any

[

]

p1 ∈ pmin, p+ (at least weakly) dominates offering any p1 > p+ , as at any of the former there is trade yielding nonnegative margins with positive probability while at any of the latter there is no chance of trade.
Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low. It is by now clear that she does not profitably deviate to
any offer lower than v− . It is easy to show that, when very pessimistic, take-the-sure-thing, which pays her
v− −κ − + (v− −κ − )δ , dominates offering any p1 > p+ , which pays 0 + (v− −κ − )δ , and at least weakly dominates offering

[

]

[

]

any p′∈ pmin, p+ , which pays her p′ − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − )(1− β0 )δ . Hence, a very pessimistic low cost seller
does not profitably deviate from take-the-sure-thing.
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(iii) First, recall that moderate pessimism is the condition under which π1 (v− ,κ − ) < π1 ( p′,κ − ), ∀p′ ≥ pmin if B
accepts p ′ with sufficiently large probability. Second, recall that p o < κ + means that pmin = κ + . Together, these

[

]

mean that if the seller’s cost is high, she is willing to consider first period offers in the interval κ + , v+ , and if her cost
is low, she will also consider making offers from the same interval if B accepts with large enough probability.
Therefore, any offer that the seller would make if her cost is high will be a pooling offer if B accepts with
sufficiently large probability. But notice that the highest pooling offer that B is certain to accept, p o , is
unacceptable to the seller if her cost is high because here pmin = κ + and p o < κ + . Therefore, there is no price that a
high cost seller is willing to offer that B can optimally accept with certainty (see Lemma 3.iii.b for details). B’s
optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept v+ with any probability, y 1 , such that 0 < y1 < y− , where y− is the
acceptance probability at which the seller is induced to gamble with an offer of v+ if her cost is low, but below
which her payoff from gambling is smaller than it is from take-the-sure-thing. Thus, if p1 =v+ , then B’s updated

[

belief is b1(•) =1. (2) Reject if p1 ∈ κ + , v+ ) , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his prior, i.e., b1(•) = b0 ,
because his strategy makes any such offer suboptimal for both seller types, yet both types would consider such an
offer if B were to accept with sufficiently large probability. (3) Reject if p1 ∈( p−,κ + ) , in which case b1(•) = 0 because,
by Lemma 1, a high cost seller never offers such a price. (3) Accept if p1 ≤ p− .
Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high. First, it is clear that she cannot profit by deviating to a
higher offer because there is no chance for trade at any price higher than v+ , while at v+ there is a positive

[

probability of trade with a positive margin. It is also clear that it cannot profit the seller to deviate to any p1 ∈ κ + , v+ ) ,
as the buyer is certain to reject any such offer. And by Lemma 1, we know that the seller does not profitably offer
any p1 < pmin = κ + if her cost is high. Hence, the seller does not profitably deviate from v+ if her cost is high.
Next consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is low. It is clear that she does not profit by deviating to
any p1 ∈( p−, v+ ) because her payoff from any such offer is 0 + (v− −κ − )δ , which is less than is her payoff from takethe-sure-thing. By Lemma 2 we know that she does not deviate to learn-then-discriminate by offering p1 = p−
because the expected payoff therefrom is smaller than is that from take-the-sure-thing when she is pessimistic.
Further, because no p1 ∈(v−, p− ) is accepted with any greater likelihood than is p− , but all yield smaller margins, no
such deviation is profitable. It is easy to show that when moderately pessimistic, a low cost seller’s expected payoff

[

]

[

]

from gambling with an offer of v+ , which is y1(v+ ) v+ −κ − + (v+ −κ − )δ β0 + (v− −κ − ) 1− y1(v+ ) β0 δ , is smaller than is her
payoff from take-the-sure-thing when y1(v+ ) < y− , as is the case here. Hence, the seller does not profitably deviate
from take-the-sure-thing if her cost is low. Note that B’s response here is not unique, as any resonse to v+ such that
0 < y1(v+ ) < y− is an equilibrium response.
Finally, observe that because B’s response to a high cost seller’s offer is not unique, neither is a high cost
seller’s updated belief about the buyer if her first period offer, v+ , is rejected. It is important, however, that we
establish the boundaries on her updated belief in the event that her offer is rejected. In particular, we must show that
the lower boundary of β 1 (• ) is positive, for if it is zero, a high cost seller withdraws from the interaction under the
belief that she cannot trade with the buyer. First, because B accepts with positive probability, we know by Bayes’
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rule that her updated belief must be smaller than her prior, i.e., β 1 (• ) < β 0 , if her offer is rejected. More important,
however, is to show that if a high cost seller’s first period offer is rejected, her updated belief is positive. Let β& be
the infimum of a high cost seller’s updated belief if her first period offer of v+ is rejected. We must show that

β& > 0 . By Eqn. (A.1) in Appendix 1, we know that a moderately pessimistic high cost seller’s updated belief in the
event of a rejection is given by β1(•) = (1− y1) β0 (1− y1β0 ) , which is a decreasing function of y1 . And because B
accepts her offer with y1 < y− , the infimum of her updated belief in the event of rejection, β& , is the value of β 1 (• )

[

]

+
−
+
−
−
−
when y1 = y− . Substituting, we find that β& = v − κ + (v − v )δ β 0 − v + κ , which is not positive if
v + − v − + (v + − v − )δ

β0 ≤

v− −κ −
.
v + − κ − + (v + − v − )δ

But moderate pessimism means β 0 ≥ β − , and pmin = κ + means β − =

(A.13)

v− −κ −
v− −κ −
,
>
κ + − κ − + (v + − v − )δ v + − κ − + (v + − v − )δ

which means that Cdn. (A.13) cannot hold if the seller is moderately pessimistic. Therefore, β& > 0 .
(iv) Recall that the seller is very optimistic when the following conditions hold. (1) A low cost seller’s
expected payoff from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering p− , which B is certain to accept, exceeds that from
gambling by offering v+ , if B accepts v+ with probability yo . And (2) a high cost seller’s expected payoff from
offering v+ is at least that from offering p o if B accepts the former with probability yo and the latter with certainty.
By Lemma 4.ii we know that when the seller is very optimistic, B’s optimal strategy is as follows. (1) Accept v+
with any probability, y 1 (v + ) , such that yo ≤ y1(v+ ) < y+ , where y+ is the acceptance probability at which a low cost
seller’s expected payoff from gambling equals that from playing learn-then-discriminate by offering p− , but below
which learn-then-discriminate by offering p− dominates gambling. Thus, on seeing that the offer is v+ , B’s updated
belief is b1(•) =1. (2) Accept all p1 ∈( p−,v+ ) with probability yo , in which case B’s updated belief is the same as his
prior. (3) Accept if p1 ≤ p− .
Consider a deviation by the seller if her cost is high. Again, we know that it does not benefit her to offer any

[

price higher than v+ . Consider a lower offer. It cannot benefit her to offer any p1 ∈ pmin, v+ ) , where
pmin = max{po,κ + }> p− , as no such price is accepted with greater likelihood and all yield smaller margins. And, by
Lemma 1, we know that it cannot benefit the seller to deviate to any p1 < pmin if her cost is high. Hence, when very
optimistic, the seller does not profitably deviate from offering v+ if her cost is high.
If the seller’s cost is low, we know by Lemma 2 that her expected payoff from playing learn-thendiscriminate by offering p− in the first period exceeds the payoff that is hers if she takes-the-sure-thing by offering
v− (or any lower price) when she is optimistic. And because no p1 ∈(v−, p− ) is accepted with greater likelihood than
is p− , but all yield smaller margins, she does not profitably deviate to any such offer. Thus, when very optimistic, a
low cost seller does not profitably deviate to any price lower than p− . Now let us consider the possibility that she
profits from offering a higher price. First, it is clear that it is not profitable for her to offer any p1 > v+ since at any
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such price there is no chance of trade. Second, it is easy to show that when very optimistic, a low cost seller’s

[

]

expected payoff from offering p− , which is p− − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − )(1− β0 )δ , exceeds that from gambling

[

]

[

]

with an offer of v+ , which is at most y1(v+ ) v+ − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − ) 1 − y1(v+ ) β0 δ when yo ≤ y1(v+ ) < y+ , as is the
case here. And because no p1 ∈( p−,v+ ) is accepted with any greater likelihood than is v+ , but all yield smaller
margins, it is not profitable for her to deviate to any such price. Therefore, if the seller’s cost is low, she does not
profitably deviate from learn-then-discriminate with an offer of p− when she is very optimistic. Note here that, as in
part (iii) of this result, the buyer’s response to a high cost seller’s offer is not unique, as any resonse to v+ such that
yo ≤ y1(v+ ) < y+ is an equilibrium response.
Finally, because B’s response to a high cost seller’s offer is not unique, a high cost seller’s updated belief
about the buyer is likewise not unique if her first period offer, v+ , is rejected. We can nonetheless establish the
boundaries within which her updated belief, β 1 (• ) , must fall. Most important is to show that the lower boundary is
positive since if β 1 (• ) is not, then a high cost seller withdraws from the interaction. First, however, we establish the
upper boundary. Recall that β 1 (• ) is a decreasing function of y1 , the probability with which B accepts the offer (see
Eqn. (A.1) in Appendix 1). Then, because here y1 is at least as large as yo and yo is the response such that

β1 (• ) = β o when the outcome is rejection, it is easy to see that β 1 (• ) can be no larger than β o if a high cost seller’s
first period offer is rejected. To show that a high cost seller’s updated belief is positive if her first period offer is
rejected, we will show that β&& , the infimum of β 1 (• ) when the seller is very optimistic, is positive. Because here y1
is smaller than y+ , we derive β&& by substituting y+ for y1 in Eqn. (A.1). After some algebra, we find that

β&& =

(v − v )δ β
) (1 − β ) + (v
+

(v

+

−κ

−

0
+

−

0

− v − )δ

> 0.



PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. (i) Recall that β − is the initial buyer reputation (equivalently, the initial seller

belief) at which a low cost seller’s expected payoff from offering pmin equals that from take-the-sure-thing if B is
certain to accept pmin. Also, recall that po ≥ κ + means that pmin = po . Hence, if B is certain to accept po , then a low
cost seller’s expected payoff from offering this price is the same as it is from take-the-sure-thing. Finally, recall that
when the seller is moderately pessimistic and po ≥ κ + , B’s optimal strategy is described in the proof of Proposition
2.i.
Given that B’s strategy is precisely the same as is given in the proof of Proposition 2.i, for the same reasons
that the seller does not profitably deviate if her cost is high there, she does not deviate here if her cost is high. If the
seller’s cost is low, deviating to a higher price is not profitable for the same reasons given in the proof of Proposition
2.i. But, for a moderately pessimistic low cost seller, β0 = β − implies that the expected payoff from playing learn-

[

]

then-discriminate by offering po , which is po −κ − + (v+ −κ − )δ β0 + (v− −κ − )(1− β0 )δ , equals the payoff from take-thesure-thing, which is v− −κ − + (v− −κ − )δ . She is therefore completely indifferent between these two strategies, and any

λ1 ∈[0,1] is optimal. Note also that the fact that any λ1 ∈[0,1] is optimal for the seller if her cost is low affects B’s
updated belief, b1(•) , on observing an offer of po (specifically, as λ1 increases, so does b1(•) if the offer is po ). And
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because there is no unique optimal value of λ1 when β0 = β − , there is no unique value of b1(•) if the offer is po . We
can, however, establish the boundaries on the buyer’s updated belief on observing a first period offer of po . Of
particular importance is the lower boundary of b1(•) , for B will accept po if, but only if, b1(•) ≥ b0 . Fortunately, it is
easy to see that for any value of λ1 ∈[0,1] , the buyer’s updated belief, b1(•) , is at least as large as his prior, b0 . By
Bayes’ rule, if the observed offer is po , then b1(•) takes its smallest value if a low cost seller pools with a high cost
one and offers po with certainty, i.e., if λ1 = 0. And by definition, if po is a pooling offer, then the buyer’s updated
belief is the same as his prior on observing it. In other words, if the first period offer is po , then the smallest
possible value of b1(•) is b0 . Hence, B accepts po . It is also important to note that none of this affects B’s updated
beliefs upon observing offers higher than po . Since either seller type is willing to make such an offer if B accepts
with sufficiently large probability, on observing any such offer the buyer’s updated belief is still the same as his
prior. His optimal response to any p1 > po is likewise unchanged: he rejects them. As a result, if the seller’s cost is
high, the unique optimal strategy for her is to offer po .
(ii) Recall that β ++ is the initial buyer reputation at which a low cost seller’s expected payoff from gambling

[

]

by offering v+ , which is v+ − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ yoβ0 + (v− − κ − )(1− yo β0 )δ , equals that from playing learn-then-

[

]

discriminate by offering p− , which is p− − κ − + (v+ − κ − )δ β0 + (v− − κ − )(1− β0 )δ , if B accepts the former with
probability yo and the latter with certainty. Also note that when the seller is hyper optimistic, B’s optimal strategy is
as described in the proof of Proposition 2.ii.
Given that B’s strategy is the same as in Proposition 2.ii, the same reasons that make it unprofitable for the
seller to deviate from offering v+ if her cost is high also apply here. If the seller’s cost is low, we use the same
arguments presented in Proposition 2.ii to show that she does not profitably deviate to any offer higher than v+ , nor
any in the interval ( p− − v+ ) . But, as β0 = β ++ means that her expected payoff from gambling by offering v+ equals
that from learn-then-discriminate by offering p− , a low cost seller is completely indifferent between these two
strategies. Therefore, any η1 ∈[0,1] is optimal. Note that because any η1 ∈[0,1] is an optimal strategy, B’s updated
belief, b1(•) , on observing an offer of v+ is affected. Specifically, because there is no unique optimal value of η1 ,
there is also no unique value of b1(•) . But there are boundaries. At one extreme, if η1 =1, i.e., if a low cost seller
were certain to pool with a high cost one, then b1(•) = b0 . At the other extreme, if η1 = 0 , i.e., if a low cost seller were
certain to separate from a high cost one, then b1(•) =1. Intermediate values of η1 yield updated buyer beliefs between

b0 and 1. Therefore, if the first period offer is v+ , we know that b1(•) ∈[b0,1] . This, however, has no effect on B’s
strategy, for if he accepts v+ with any larger probability than yo , a low cost seller is no longer indifferent between

v+ and p− , and we encounter the contradictions described in the proof of Corollary 2. And if he accepts v+ with any
smaller probability than yo , a high cost seller reduces her offer slighly, and again we encounter the contradictions
described in the proof of Corollary 2. 
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